Armed conflicts in Africa: a continent “trapped in stereotypes”?

In "L’Économie africaine 2025", you state that Africa remains the region with the most state-based armed conflicts per year. You go on to ask whether Africa really is “a continent of war”. Can you tell us more?

Élodie Riche: Most research relativizes the idea of Africa as a war-ridden continent: while there are certainly many conflicts in Africa and their number is increasing, they’re not the deadliest. In any event, they’re less deadly than the wars in the Middle East and Asia.

The idea of a conflict-ridden Africa owes much to the image of warlords, ever-present in the 1990s, and seemingly apolitical conflicts that are in reality just as political as those of the rest of the world. What really sets apart African conflicts is that they are often subject to external intervention.

Niagalé Bagayoko: The political dimensions of armed conflict in Africa have often been hidden. Solutions were mostly based either on humanitarian interventions, as in Somalia in the 1990s, or via an extremely technical perspective in which only State reform was thought to be able to domesticate violence that was perceived as irrational. But the political aspect was in fact extremely present in non-State entities, which also put forward an alternative vision, not just of the State, but also more broadly of society.

See also: Interventions in contexts of armed conflict: under what conditions can development help stabilize spaces plagued by violence?

What impact do these conflicts have on the development of the affected countries?

E.R.: There’s obviously a significant cost, in terms of both human and economic losses. Some economists have tried to quantify this loss and generally estimate it at two or three points of gross domestic product (GDP) per year on average. These losses also mean reduced budgets for development, as crises force governments to spend more on their military than on social programs.

But these crises don’t automatically weaken the State: they can also be the occasion for resolving problems and giving impetus to positive change. For example, one good thing that comes out of some conflicts is the greater role of women in the economy and in politics.

N.B.: We shouldn’t forget that war has always been a means of forging societies. Unfortunately, most progress is made through violence. The dynamics of conflict at work in Africa are part of structural movements, and they contribute to reshaping models that have turned out not to correspond to most people’s aspirations.

What are people asking for today? More patriotism and more nationalism. Africa has been trapped in stereotypes, with civil society being idealized as a defender of liberal and democratic values. But this image absolutely does not apply now, as we can see in today’s collective mobilizations which – even if not in the form of war – are no less violent, at least in terms of rhetoric.

See also: Inequalities in sub-Saharan Africa: multidimensional perspectives and future challenges

How do you assess the external interventions aimed at ending these conflicts, and in particular “stabilization” interventions that combine military action and aid for people?

N.B.: Both bilateral and multilateral partners have tried to impose a form of stabilization on Africa that has been a total failure. This is due mostly to the difficulty of taking context into account. Totally standardized solutions claiming to be valid everywhere at all times were implemented, but they met neither the expectations of governments nor those of the people.

Typically, we have tried to reform institutions from the outside. However, social contracts can’t be recreated for others: there’s nothing more characteristic of the essence of a political entity than the choice of social relations and power it establishes internally. And yet, standardized solutions have been proposed and have turned out to be at odds with the vision held by societies. Researchers have been repeating for a decade that these solutions do not work.

E.R.: There was a tendency to develop solutions that, technically, were sophisticated and well-designed, but that didn’t correspond to local desires and realities. There was too much confidence in the solutions proposed. Furthermore, the notion of stabilization is extremely conservative. In conflicts, there are sometimes violent demands that deserve to be heard. The idea of going back to the initial situation of a crisis, without taking these demands into account, is disputable.

N.B.: The question of stabilization is fundamental, because we can turn it around and ask whether the return of the military to power, or the assertion of a stronger role for an extremely conservative society or religion, might not ultimately mean a form of authoritarian stabilization taking hold. Indeed, the end goal of stabilization has also been to avoid negative fall-out coming from the African continent.

See also:  Social Contracts for Development: Bargaining, Contention, and Social Inclusion in Sub-Saharan Africa

Is it still possible to rectify the situation?

E.R.: It’s important to take stock of the situation today. International institutions such as the UN have begun a reflection process on their “multidimensional” interventions and are scaling them back. An absence of self-criticism fuels a sense of failure, which in turn nurtures solutions of sheer force. And other players then come to the conclusion that only military force can resolve conflicts. That’s not a totally far-fetched conclusion, but it’s obviously not one we can accept.

N.B.: It’s going to take a long time to reverse the situation. Firstly, because most of the players have adopted the same conflict-resolution practices. And secondly, because an entire generation of project managers has been trained in these approaches, adopting a way of thinking that is ill-suited to the reality.

The people and governments that have financed these international operations are also suffering aid fatigue and want to redirect investment to their own countries. But it’s not just a question of donor repudiation: it’s also rejection by the recipients, who say they don’t want any more aid. We can’t resist this change. There’s nothing we can do about it, the damage is done.

What solutions work in these conflict situations?

N.B.: We must develop critical thinking and knowledge about the societies in which we want to intervene. And we need to watch what the other forms of intervention propose, because some of them are very effective!

E.R.: Development assistance is at its most useful in the preventive phases. With regard to conflict intervention, preference can be given to small projects that local stakeholders want and decide on, and that take a modest approach and reflect grassroots concerns. Projects should have a political dimension, and not just offer a combination of security and development. That’s what can work today, and what aid should focus on.

The publication “L’Économie africaine 2025” is the result of close collaboration between AFD researchers and academics specializing in African States. It analyzes the challenges facing Africa by deconstructing preconceived ideas.

To find out more: 

• "L’Économie africaine 2025" is available from the publisher Editions La Découverte (in French).
• "L'Économie africaine 2025" English version of Introduction & Chapter 1.
• "L'Économie africaine 2024" English version of Introduction & Chapter 1.
• "African Economic Outlook 2024", produced by the African Development Bank (AfDB)